使用 RelaxNG-schema 验证 XML 时出现问题
Problems validating XML with RelaxNG-schema
我在根据我的 RelaxNG 架构验证 XML 时遇到问题。我对放松有点陌生，所以如果错误很明显，请原谅。
Jing验证时出现三种类型的错误：
错误 1："element "此处不允许文章“；预期元素 "chapter"”
错误 2："element "此处不允许文章“；需要元素结束标记”
错误 2 "element "此处不允许使用“章节”；需要元素结束标记“
XML-文件：
<?xml-model href="publications.rng" type="application/xml"
schematypens="http://relaxng.org/ns/structure/1.0"?>
<publications>
<book>
<title>group agency: the possibility, design, and status of corporate
agents</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p pettit</author>
<publisher>oxford university press</publisher>
<cited>598</cited>
<published>2011</published>
</book>
<article>
<title>aggregating sets of judgments: an impossibility result</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p pettit</author>
<journal>economics and philosophy</journal>
<volume>18</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>89-110</pages>
<cited>558</cited>
<published>2002</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>social choice theory and deliberative democracy: a reconciliation</title>
<author>js dryzek</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>british journal of political science</journal>
<volume>33</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>1-28</pages>
<cited>479</cited>
<published>2003</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>epistemic democracy: generalizing the condorcet jury theorem</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>re goodin</author>
<journal>journal of political philosophy</journal>
<volume>9</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>277-306</pages>
<cited>409</cited>
<published>2001</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>judgment aggregation: a survey</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>c puppe</author>
<collection>handbook of rational and social choice</collection>
<cited>240</cited>
<published>2009</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>social choice and welfare</journal>
<volume>29</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>19-33</pages>
<cited>220</cited>
<published>2007</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>aggregating sets of judgments: two impossibility results compared</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p pettit</author>
<journal>synthese</journal>
<volume>140</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>207-235</pages>
<cited>203</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>the discursive dilemma and public reason</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>ethics</journal>
<volume>116</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>362-402</pages>
<cited>154</cited>
<published>2006</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>deliberation, single-peakedness, and the possibility of meaningful democracy: evidence from deliberative polls</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>rc luskin</author>
<author>js fishkin</author>
<author>i mclean</author>
<journal>journal of politics</journal>
<volume>75</volume>
<number>(01)</number>
<pages>80-95</pages>
<cited>143</cited>
<published>2013</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>judgment aggregation by quota rules: majority voting generalized</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>journal of theoretical politics</journal>
<volume>19</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>391-424</pages>
<cited>130</cited>
<published>2007</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>disaggregating deliberation's effects: an experiment within a deliberative poll</title>
<author>c farrar</author>
<author>js fishkin</author>
<author>dp green</author>
<author>c list</author>
<author>rc luskin</author>
<author>el paluck</author>
<journal>british journal of political science</journal>
<volume>40</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>333-47</pages>
<cited>129</cited>
<published>2010</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>the theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>synthese</journal>
<volume>187</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>179-207</pages>
<cited>124</cited>
<published>2012</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>a model of path-dependence in decisions over multiple propositions</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>american political science review</journal>
<volume>98</volume>
<pages>495-514</pages>
<cited>124</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>strategy-proof judgment aggregation</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>economics and philosophy</journal>
<volume>23</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>269</pages>
<cited>123</cited>
<published>2007</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>non-reductive physicalism and the limits of the exclusion principle</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p menzies</author>
<journal>journal of philosophy</journal>
<volume>106</volume>
<number>(9)</number>
<pages>475-502</pages>
<cited>106</cited>
<published>2009</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>democracy in animal groups: a political science perspective</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>trends in ecology and evolution</journal>
<volume>19</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>168-169</pages>
<cited>98</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>a reason‐based theory of rational choice</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>nous</journal>
<volume>47</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>104-134</pages>
<cited>95</cited>
<published>2013</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>judgment aggregation without full rationality</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>social choice and welfare</journal>
<volume>31</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>15-39</pages>
<cited>95</cited>
<published>2008</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>group agency and supervenience</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p pettit</author>
<journal>the southern journal of philosophy</journal>
<volume>44</volume>
<number>(s1)</number>
<pages>85-105</pages>
<cited>87</cited>
<published>2006</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>the probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>social choice and welfare</journal>
<volume>24</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>3-32</pages>
<cited>82</cited>
<published>2005</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>group knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation perspective</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>episteme</journal>
<volume>2</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>25-38</pages>
<cited>79</cited>
<published>2005</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>a model of jury decisions where all jurors have the same evidence</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>synthese</journal>
<volume>142</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>175-202</pages>
<cited>77</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>corrigendum to "a possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions" [mathematical social sciences 45 (2003), 1-13]</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>mathematical social sciences</journal>
<volume>52</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>109-110</pages>
<cited>73</cited>
<published>2006</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>a possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>mathematical social sciences</journal>
<volume>45</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>1-13</pages>
<cited>73</cited>
<published>2003</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>two concepts of agreement</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>the good society</journal>
<volume>11</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>72-79</pages>
<cited>73</cited>
<published>2002</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>methodological individualism and holism in political science: a reconciliation</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>k spiekermann</author>
<journal>american political science review</journal>
<volume>107</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>629-643</pages>
<cited>71</cited>
<published>2013</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>introduction to judgment aggregation</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>b polak</author>
<journal>journal of economic theory</journal>
<volume>145</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>441-466</pages>
<cited>71</cited>
<published>2010</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>on the many as one: a reply to kornhauser and sager</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p pettit</author>
<journal>philosophy and public affairs</journal>
<volume>33</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>377-390</pages>
<cited>62</cited>
<published>2005</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>where do preferences come from?</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>international journal of game theory</journal>
<volume>42</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>613-637</pages>
<cited>61</cited>
<published>2013</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>can there be a global demos? an agency‐based approach</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>m koenig-archibugi</author>
<journal>philosophy and public affairs</journal>
<volume>38</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>76-110</pages>
<cited>57</cited>
<published>2010</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>majority voting on restricted domains</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>journal of economic theory</journal>
<volume>145</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>512-543</pages>
<cited>56</cited>
<published>2010</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>a conditional defense of plurality rule: generalizing may's theorem in a restricted informational environment</title>
<author>re goodin</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>american journal of political science</journal>
<volume>50</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>940-949</pages>
<cited>54</cited>
<published>2006</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>in defence of voting power analysis: responses to albert</title>
<author>ds felsenthal</author>
<author>d leech</author>
<author>c list</author>
<author>m machover</author>
<journal>european union politics</journal>
<volume>4</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>473-497</pages>
<cited>46</cited>
<published>2003</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>free will, determinism, and the possibility of doing otherwise</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>noûs</journal>
<volume>48</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>156-178</pages>
<cited>43</cited>
<published>2014</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>a liberal paradox for judgment aggregation</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>social choice and welfare</journal>
<volume>31</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>59-78</pages>
<cited>42</cited>
<published>2008</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>social choice theory</title>
<author>c list</author>
<collection>stanford encyclopedia of philosophy</collection>
<cited>40</cited>
<published>2013</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>group communication and the transformation of judgments: an impossibility result</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>journal of political philosophy</journal>
<volume>19</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>1-27</pages>
<cited>39</cited>
<published>2011</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>the causal autonomy of the special sciences</title>
<author>p menzies</author>
<author>c list</author>
<collection>emergence in mind</collection>
<editors>
edited by: c. mcdonald and g. mcdonald</editors>
<cited>39</cited>
<published>2010</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>republican freedom and the rule of law</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>politics, philosophy and economics</journal>
<volume>5</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>201-220</pages>
<cited>39</cited>
<published>2006</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>on the significance of the absolute margin</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>the british journal for the philosophy of science</journal>
<volume>55</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>521-544</pages>
<cited>33</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>social choice and welfare</journal>
<volume>40</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>1067-1095</pages>
<cited>32</cited>
<published>2013</published>
</article>
<book>
<title>deliberation and decision: economics, constitutional theory and deliberative democracy</title>
<author>a van aaken</author>
<author>c list</author>
<author>c luetge</author>
<publisher>ashgate pub ltd</publisher>
<cited>31</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</book>
<article>
<title>are interpersonal comparisons of utility indeterminate?</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>erkenntnis</journal>
<volume>58</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>229-260</pages>
<cited>30</cited>
<published>2003</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<collection>economics and philosophy</collection>
<cited>27</cited>
<published>2016</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>a simple proof of sen's possibility theorem on majority decisions</title>
<author>c elsholtz</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>elemente der mathematik</journal>
<volume>60</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>45-56</pages>
<cited>19</cited>
<published>2005</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>aggregating causal judgements</title>
<author>r bradley</author>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>philosophy of science</journal>
<volume>81</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>491-515</pages>
<cited>17</cited>
<published>2014</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>emergent chance</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>m pivato</author>
<journal>the philosophical review</journal>
<volume>124</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>119-152</pages>
<cited>15</cited>
<published>2015</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>the impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>theory and decision</journal>
<volume>68</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>281-299</pages>
<cited>15</cited>
<published>2010</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>reason-based choice and context-dependence: an explanatory framework</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>economics and philosophy</journal>
<volume>32</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>175-229</pages>
<cited>14</cited>
<published>2016</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>collective wisdom: lessons from the theory of judgment aggregation</title>
<author>c list</author>
<collection>ccollective wisdom: principles and mechanisms</collection>
<cited>14</cited>
<published>2012</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>multidimensional welfare aggregation</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>public choice</journal>
<volume>119</volume>
<number>(1-2)</number>
<pages>119-142</pages>
<cited>14</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>craig's theorem and the empirical underdetermination thesis reassessed</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>disputatio</journal>
<volume>7</volume>
<pages>28-39</pages>
<cited>14</cited>
<published>1999</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>when to defer to supermajority testimony—and when not</title>
<author>c list</author>
<collection>essays in collective epistemology</collection>
<cited>13</cited>
<published>2014</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>"deliberative polling" als methode zum erlernen des demokratischen sprechens</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>a sliwka</author>
<journal>zeitschrift für politik</journal>
<volume>51</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>87-105</pages>
<cited>10</cited>
<published>2004</published>
<language>german</language>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>the methodology of political theory</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>
valentini</author>
<collection>the oxford handbook of philosophical methodology</collection>
<cited>8</cited>
<published>2016</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>introduction to the special issue of economics and philosophy on neuroeconomics</title>
<author>g bonanno</author>
<author>c list</author>
<author>b tungodden</author>
<author>p vallentyne</author>
<journal>economics and philosophy</journal>
<volume>24</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>301-302</pages>
<cited>8</cited>
<published>2008</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>social choice theory and deliberative democracy: a response to aldred</title>
<author>js dryzek</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>british journal of political science</journal>
<volume>34</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>752-758</pages>
<cited>8</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>a note on introducing a “zero‐line” of welfare as an escape route from arrow’s theorem</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>pacific economic review</journal>
<volume>6</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>223-238</pages>
<cited>7</cited>
<published>2001</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>episteme symposium on group agency: replies to gaus, cariani, sylvan, and briggs</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p pettit</author>
<journal>episteme</journal>
<volume>9</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>293</pages>
<cited>5</cited>
<published>2012</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>probabilistic opinion pooling generalized: part two: the premise-based approach</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>social choice and welfare</journal>
<volume>48</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>787–814</pages>
<cited>4</cited>
<published>2017</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>two intuitions about free will: alternative possibilities and intentional endorsement</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>w rabinowicz</author>
<journal>philosophical perspectives</journal>
<volume>28</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>155-172</pages>
<cited>4</cited>
<published>2014</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>independence and interdependence: lessons from the hive</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>a vermeule</author>
<journal>rationality and society</journal>
<volume>26</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>170-207</pages>
<cited>4</cited>
<published>2014</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>reasons for (prior) belief in bayesian epistemology</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>synthese</journal>
<volume>190</volume>
<number>(5)</number>
<pages>787-808</pages>
<cited>4</cited>
<published>2013</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>freedom as independence</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>l valentini</author>
<journal>ethics</journal>
<volume>126</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>1043-1074</pages>
<cited>3</cited>
<published>2016</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>belief revision generalized: a joint characterization of bayes' and jeffrey's rules</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<author>r bradley</author>
<journal>journal of economic theory</journal>
<volume>162</volume>
<pages>352–371</pages>
<cited>3</cited>
<published>2016</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>my brain made me do it: the exclusion argument against free will, and what’s wrong with it</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p menzies</author>
<collection>making a difference</collection>
<editors>
edited by: h. beebee, c. hitchcock, and h. price</editors>
<cited>3</cited>
<published>2016</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>what matters and how it matters: a choice-theoretic representation of moral theories</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>philosophical review</journal>
<volume>0</volume>
<pages>0</pages>
<cited>2</cited>
<published>2017</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>the condorcet jury theorem and voter-specific truth</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>k spiekermann</author>
<collection>goldman and his critics</collection>
<cited>2</cited>
<published>2016</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>introduction to the special issue of economics and philosophy on ambiguity aversion</title>
<author>g bonanno</author>
<author>m van hees</author>
<author>c list</author>
<author>b tungodden</author>
<journal>economics and philosophy</journal>
<volume>25</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>247-248</pages>
<cited>2</cited>
<published>2009</published>
</article>
</publications>
XML
的 Relaxng 模式
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<element name="published"><data datatypeLibrary="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes" type="int"/></element>
<zeroOrMore>
<element name="language"><text/></element>
</zeroOrMore>
</element>
<element name="chapter">
<element name="title"><text/></element>
<oneOrMore>
<element name="author"><text/></element>
</oneOrMore>
<element name="collection"><text/></element>
<zeroOrMore>
<element name="editors"><text/></element>
</zeroOrMore>
<element name="cited"><data datatypeLibrary="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes" type="int"/></element>
<element name="published"><data datatypeLibrary="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes" type="int"/></element>
<zeroOrMore>
<element name="language"><text/></element>
</zeroOrMore>
</element>
</element>
</start>
您的 XML 似乎与架构不匹配，因为：
元素的顺序定义为 "book"、"article"、"chapter" - 您有无序元素。
我不熟悉 RelaxNG-schema 但在传统的 XSD 模式中必须定义元素出现次数（默认值 min=1 max=1）。您的架构似乎只允许一本书，然后是一篇文章，然后是一章。
所以，
Error 1: "element "article" not allowed here; expected element "chapter""
出现是因为在第一个之后还有第二个 <article>，但预期 <chapter>。
Error 2: "element "article" not allowed here; expected the element end-tag"
Error 2 "element "chapter" not allowed here; expected the element end-tag"
出现是因为第一本书和第一篇文章之后有很多文章、章节和书籍...
建议：
- 使用无序元素 - 使用 XML 书籍、文章、章节的选择
- 将该选项的出现定义为 "many"
我知道如何在 XSD 中做到这一点，但对于 RelaxNG，这取决于您...
我在根据我的 RelaxNG 架构验证 XML 时遇到问题。我对放松有点陌生，所以如果错误很明显，请原谅。
Jing验证时出现三种类型的错误：
错误 1："element "此处不允许文章“；预期元素 "chapter"”
错误 2："element "此处不允许文章“；需要元素结束标记”
错误 2 "element "此处不允许使用“章节”；需要元素结束标记“
XML-文件：
<?xml-model href="publications.rng" type="application/xml"
schematypens="http://relaxng.org/ns/structure/1.0"?>
<publications>
<book>
<title>group agency: the possibility, design, and status of corporate
agents</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p pettit</author>
<publisher>oxford university press</publisher>
<cited>598</cited>
<published>2011</published>
</book>
<article>
<title>aggregating sets of judgments: an impossibility result</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p pettit</author>
<journal>economics and philosophy</journal>
<volume>18</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>89-110</pages>
<cited>558</cited>
<published>2002</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>social choice theory and deliberative democracy: a reconciliation</title>
<author>js dryzek</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>british journal of political science</journal>
<volume>33</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>1-28</pages>
<cited>479</cited>
<published>2003</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>epistemic democracy: generalizing the condorcet jury theorem</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>re goodin</author>
<journal>journal of political philosophy</journal>
<volume>9</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>277-306</pages>
<cited>409</cited>
<published>2001</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>judgment aggregation: a survey</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>c puppe</author>
<collection>handbook of rational and social choice</collection>
<cited>240</cited>
<published>2009</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>social choice and welfare</journal>
<volume>29</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>19-33</pages>
<cited>220</cited>
<published>2007</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>aggregating sets of judgments: two impossibility results compared</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p pettit</author>
<journal>synthese</journal>
<volume>140</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>207-235</pages>
<cited>203</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>the discursive dilemma and public reason</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>ethics</journal>
<volume>116</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>362-402</pages>
<cited>154</cited>
<published>2006</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>deliberation, single-peakedness, and the possibility of meaningful democracy: evidence from deliberative polls</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>rc luskin</author>
<author>js fishkin</author>
<author>i mclean</author>
<journal>journal of politics</journal>
<volume>75</volume>
<number>(01)</number>
<pages>80-95</pages>
<cited>143</cited>
<published>2013</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>judgment aggregation by quota rules: majority voting generalized</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>journal of theoretical politics</journal>
<volume>19</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>391-424</pages>
<cited>130</cited>
<published>2007</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>disaggregating deliberation's effects: an experiment within a deliberative poll</title>
<author>c farrar</author>
<author>js fishkin</author>
<author>dp green</author>
<author>c list</author>
<author>rc luskin</author>
<author>el paluck</author>
<journal>british journal of political science</journal>
<volume>40</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>333-47</pages>
<cited>129</cited>
<published>2010</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>the theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>synthese</journal>
<volume>187</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>179-207</pages>
<cited>124</cited>
<published>2012</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>a model of path-dependence in decisions over multiple propositions</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>american political science review</journal>
<volume>98</volume>
<pages>495-514</pages>
<cited>124</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>strategy-proof judgment aggregation</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>economics and philosophy</journal>
<volume>23</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>269</pages>
<cited>123</cited>
<published>2007</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>non-reductive physicalism and the limits of the exclusion principle</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p menzies</author>
<journal>journal of philosophy</journal>
<volume>106</volume>
<number>(9)</number>
<pages>475-502</pages>
<cited>106</cited>
<published>2009</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>democracy in animal groups: a political science perspective</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>trends in ecology and evolution</journal>
<volume>19</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>168-169</pages>
<cited>98</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>a reason‐based theory of rational choice</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>nous</journal>
<volume>47</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>104-134</pages>
<cited>95</cited>
<published>2013</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>judgment aggregation without full rationality</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>social choice and welfare</journal>
<volume>31</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>15-39</pages>
<cited>95</cited>
<published>2008</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>group agency and supervenience</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p pettit</author>
<journal>the southern journal of philosophy</journal>
<volume>44</volume>
<number>(s1)</number>
<pages>85-105</pages>
<cited>87</cited>
<published>2006</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>the probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>social choice and welfare</journal>
<volume>24</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>3-32</pages>
<cited>82</cited>
<published>2005</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>group knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation perspective</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>episteme</journal>
<volume>2</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>25-38</pages>
<cited>79</cited>
<published>2005</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>a model of jury decisions where all jurors have the same evidence</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>synthese</journal>
<volume>142</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>175-202</pages>
<cited>77</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>corrigendum to "a possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions" [mathematical social sciences 45 (2003), 1-13]</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>mathematical social sciences</journal>
<volume>52</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>109-110</pages>
<cited>73</cited>
<published>2006</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>a possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>mathematical social sciences</journal>
<volume>45</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>1-13</pages>
<cited>73</cited>
<published>2003</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>two concepts of agreement</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>the good society</journal>
<volume>11</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>72-79</pages>
<cited>73</cited>
<published>2002</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>methodological individualism and holism in political science: a reconciliation</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>k spiekermann</author>
<journal>american political science review</journal>
<volume>107</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>629-643</pages>
<cited>71</cited>
<published>2013</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>introduction to judgment aggregation</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>b polak</author>
<journal>journal of economic theory</journal>
<volume>145</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>441-466</pages>
<cited>71</cited>
<published>2010</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>on the many as one: a reply to kornhauser and sager</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p pettit</author>
<journal>philosophy and public affairs</journal>
<volume>33</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>377-390</pages>
<cited>62</cited>
<published>2005</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>where do preferences come from?</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>international journal of game theory</journal>
<volume>42</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>613-637</pages>
<cited>61</cited>
<published>2013</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>can there be a global demos? an agency‐based approach</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>m koenig-archibugi</author>
<journal>philosophy and public affairs</journal>
<volume>38</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>76-110</pages>
<cited>57</cited>
<published>2010</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>majority voting on restricted domains</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>journal of economic theory</journal>
<volume>145</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>512-543</pages>
<cited>56</cited>
<published>2010</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>a conditional defense of plurality rule: generalizing may's theorem in a restricted informational environment</title>
<author>re goodin</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>american journal of political science</journal>
<volume>50</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>940-949</pages>
<cited>54</cited>
<published>2006</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>in defence of voting power analysis: responses to albert</title>
<author>ds felsenthal</author>
<author>d leech</author>
<author>c list</author>
<author>m machover</author>
<journal>european union politics</journal>
<volume>4</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>473-497</pages>
<cited>46</cited>
<published>2003</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>free will, determinism, and the possibility of doing otherwise</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>noûs</journal>
<volume>48</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>156-178</pages>
<cited>43</cited>
<published>2014</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>a liberal paradox for judgment aggregation</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>social choice and welfare</journal>
<volume>31</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>59-78</pages>
<cited>42</cited>
<published>2008</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>social choice theory</title>
<author>c list</author>
<collection>stanford encyclopedia of philosophy</collection>
<cited>40</cited>
<published>2013</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>group communication and the transformation of judgments: an impossibility result</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>journal of political philosophy</journal>
<volume>19</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>1-27</pages>
<cited>39</cited>
<published>2011</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>the causal autonomy of the special sciences</title>
<author>p menzies</author>
<author>c list</author>
<collection>emergence in mind</collection>
<editors>
edited by: c. mcdonald and g. mcdonald</editors>
<cited>39</cited>
<published>2010</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>republican freedom and the rule of law</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>politics, philosophy and economics</journal>
<volume>5</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>201-220</pages>
<cited>39</cited>
<published>2006</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>on the significance of the absolute margin</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>the british journal for the philosophy of science</journal>
<volume>55</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>521-544</pages>
<cited>33</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>social choice and welfare</journal>
<volume>40</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>1067-1095</pages>
<cited>32</cited>
<published>2013</published>
</article>
<book>
<title>deliberation and decision: economics, constitutional theory and deliberative democracy</title>
<author>a van aaken</author>
<author>c list</author>
<author>c luetge</author>
<publisher>ashgate pub ltd</publisher>
<cited>31</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</book>
<article>
<title>are interpersonal comparisons of utility indeterminate?</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>erkenntnis</journal>
<volume>58</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>229-260</pages>
<cited>30</cited>
<published>2003</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<collection>economics and philosophy</collection>
<cited>27</cited>
<published>2016</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>a simple proof of sen's possibility theorem on majority decisions</title>
<author>c elsholtz</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>elemente der mathematik</journal>
<volume>60</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>45-56</pages>
<cited>19</cited>
<published>2005</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>aggregating causal judgements</title>
<author>r bradley</author>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>philosophy of science</journal>
<volume>81</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>491-515</pages>
<cited>17</cited>
<published>2014</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>emergent chance</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>m pivato</author>
<journal>the philosophical review</journal>
<volume>124</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>119-152</pages>
<cited>15</cited>
<published>2015</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>the impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>theory and decision</journal>
<volume>68</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>281-299</pages>
<cited>15</cited>
<published>2010</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>reason-based choice and context-dependence: an explanatory framework</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>economics and philosophy</journal>
<volume>32</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>175-229</pages>
<cited>14</cited>
<published>2016</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>collective wisdom: lessons from the theory of judgment aggregation</title>
<author>c list</author>
<collection>ccollective wisdom: principles and mechanisms</collection>
<cited>14</cited>
<published>2012</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>multidimensional welfare aggregation</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>public choice</journal>
<volume>119</volume>
<number>(1-2)</number>
<pages>119-142</pages>
<cited>14</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>craig's theorem and the empirical underdetermination thesis reassessed</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>disputatio</journal>
<volume>7</volume>
<pages>28-39</pages>
<cited>14</cited>
<published>1999</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>when to defer to supermajority testimony—and when not</title>
<author>c list</author>
<collection>essays in collective epistemology</collection>
<cited>13</cited>
<published>2014</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>"deliberative polling" als methode zum erlernen des demokratischen sprechens</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>a sliwka</author>
<journal>zeitschrift für politik</journal>
<volume>51</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>87-105</pages>
<cited>10</cited>
<published>2004</published>
<language>german</language>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>the methodology of political theory</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>
valentini</author>
<collection>the oxford handbook of philosophical methodology</collection>
<cited>8</cited>
<published>2016</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>introduction to the special issue of economics and philosophy on neuroeconomics</title>
<author>g bonanno</author>
<author>c list</author>
<author>b tungodden</author>
<author>p vallentyne</author>
<journal>economics and philosophy</journal>
<volume>24</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>301-302</pages>
<cited>8</cited>
<published>2008</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>social choice theory and deliberative democracy: a response to aldred</title>
<author>js dryzek</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>british journal of political science</journal>
<volume>34</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>752-758</pages>
<cited>8</cited>
<published>2004</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>a note on introducing a “zero‐line” of welfare as an escape route from arrow’s theorem</title>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>pacific economic review</journal>
<volume>6</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>223-238</pages>
<cited>7</cited>
<published>2001</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>episteme symposium on group agency: replies to gaus, cariani, sylvan, and briggs</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p pettit</author>
<journal>episteme</journal>
<volume>9</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>293</pages>
<cited>5</cited>
<published>2012</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>probabilistic opinion pooling generalized: part two: the premise-based approach</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>social choice and welfare</journal>
<volume>48</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>787–814</pages>
<cited>4</cited>
<published>2017</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>two intuitions about free will: alternative possibilities and intentional endorsement</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>w rabinowicz</author>
<journal>philosophical perspectives</journal>
<volume>28</volume>
<number>(1)</number>
<pages>155-172</pages>
<cited>4</cited>
<published>2014</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>independence and interdependence: lessons from the hive</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>a vermeule</author>
<journal>rationality and society</journal>
<volume>26</volume>
<number>(2)</number>
<pages>170-207</pages>
<cited>4</cited>
<published>2014</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>reasons for (prior) belief in bayesian epistemology</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>synthese</journal>
<volume>190</volume>
<number>(5)</number>
<pages>787-808</pages>
<cited>4</cited>
<published>2013</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>freedom as independence</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>l valentini</author>
<journal>ethics</journal>
<volume>126</volume>
<number>(4)</number>
<pages>1043-1074</pages>
<cited>3</cited>
<published>2016</published>
</article>
<article>
<title>belief revision generalized: a joint characterization of bayes' and jeffrey's rules</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<author>r bradley</author>
<journal>journal of economic theory</journal>
<volume>162</volume>
<pages>352–371</pages>
<cited>3</cited>
<published>2016</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>my brain made me do it: the exclusion argument against free will, and what’s wrong with it</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>p menzies</author>
<collection>making a difference</collection>
<editors>
edited by: h. beebee, c. hitchcock, and h. price</editors>
<cited>3</cited>
<published>2016</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>what matters and how it matters: a choice-theoretic representation of moral theories</title>
<author>f dietrich</author>
<author>c list</author>
<journal>philosophical review</journal>
<volume>0</volume>
<pages>0</pages>
<cited>2</cited>
<published>2017</published>
</article>
<chapter>
<title>the condorcet jury theorem and voter-specific truth</title>
<author>c list</author>
<author>k spiekermann</author>
<collection>goldman and his critics</collection>
<cited>2</cited>
<published>2016</published>
</chapter>
<article>
<title>introduction to the special issue of economics and philosophy on ambiguity aversion</title>
<author>g bonanno</author>
<author>m van hees</author>
<author>c list</author>
<author>b tungodden</author>
<journal>economics and philosophy</journal>
<volume>25</volume>
<number>(3)</number>
<pages>247-248</pages>
<cited>2</cited>
<published>2009</published>
</article>
</publications>
XML
的 Relaxng 模式<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<grammar
xmlns="http://relaxng.org/ns/structure/1.0"
xmlns:a="http://relaxng.org/ns/compatibility/annotations/1.0"
datatypeLibrary="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes">
<start>
<element name="publications">
<element name="book">
<element name="title"><text/></element>
<oneOrMore>
<element name="author"><text/></element>
</oneOrMore>
<element name="publisher"><text/></element>
<element name="cited"><data datatypeLibrary="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes" type="int"/></element>
<element name="published"><data datatypeLibrary="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes" type="gYear"/></element>
<zeroOrMore>
<element name="language"><text/></element>
</zeroOrMore>
</element>
<element name="article">
<element name="title"><text/></element>
<oneOrMore>
<element name="author"><text/></element>
</oneOrMore>
<element name="journal"><text/></element>
<element name="volume"><data datatypeLibrary="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes" type="int"/></element>
<optional>
<element name="number"><data datatypeLibrary="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes" type="string"></data></element>
</optional>
<element name="pages"><data datatypeLibrary="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes" type="string"/></element>
<element name="cited"><data datatypeLibrary="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes" type="int"/></element>
<element name="published"><data datatypeLibrary="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes" type="int"/></element>
<zeroOrMore>
<element name="language"><text/></element>
</zeroOrMore>
</element>
<element name="chapter">
<element name="title"><text/></element>
<oneOrMore>
<element name="author"><text/></element>
</oneOrMore>
<element name="collection"><text/></element>
<zeroOrMore>
<element name="editors"><text/></element>
</zeroOrMore>
<element name="cited"><data datatypeLibrary="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes" type="int"/></element>
<element name="published"><data datatypeLibrary="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes" type="int"/></element>
<zeroOrMore>
<element name="language"><text/></element>
</zeroOrMore>
</element>
</element>
</start>
您的 XML 似乎与架构不匹配，因为：
元素的顺序定义为 "book"、"article"、"chapter" - 您有无序元素。
我不熟悉 RelaxNG-schema 但在传统的 XSD 模式中必须定义元素出现次数（默认值 min=1 max=1）。您的架构似乎只允许一本书，然后是一篇文章，然后是一章。
所以，
Error 1: "element "article" not allowed here; expected element "chapter""
出现是因为在第一个之后还有第二个 <article>，但预期 <chapter>。
Error 2: "element "article" not allowed here; expected the element end-tag" Error 2 "element "chapter" not allowed here; expected the element end-tag"
出现是因为第一本书和第一篇文章之后有很多文章、章节和书籍...
建议：
- 使用无序元素 - 使用 XML 书籍、文章、章节的选择
- 将该选项的出现定义为 "many"
我知道如何在 XSD 中做到这一点，但对于 RelaxNG，这取决于您...